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Introduction

*
This contribution aims at grasping the forms and the weight of legal training and beyond that, of "legal capital" (Vauchez, 2008) , in the specific case of the top officials of the European Commission. From our point of view, this group constitutes a valuable analytical tool in order to tackle two closely related (but not similar) questions.
First, studying their background enables us to contribute to the study of the European legal field, by shedding light on a specific area in that space. This area is characterized by the strong degree of permanence of the social agents and simultaneously, by the fact that their credit is based not so much on the possession and implementation of a "legal capital" as on the embodiment of bureaucratic excellence. In other words, the professionals of law there are seldom "pure jurists" (Dezalay, 1990) , unlike in other areas of the European legal space. While they do possess legal capital, it mostly has significance in a hybrid form, transformed by their practice as top officials, or as an underlying dimension of the bureaucratic capital (Bourdieu, 1996) these agents acquire and, to some extent, invent.
The study of top officials also allows to introduce a question that is broader than that of the legal field, even though it is evidently related to it. Indeed, it allows to put forward indicators on the variation of legal capital and its relative value in the European institutional space. Far from constituting a homogeneous entity, the Commission's top officials first of all map out a space of positions structured by the unequal distribution of capital, more or less national or international, sectoral and political. This space is also a space of struggles, within which agents fight over the definition of the legitimate properties to represent the figure of the top European official. In this sense, the study of the top European officials helps to analyse how legal capital is an instrument, or even a stake, in these struggles. 1 The population of the Commission's top officials is also exemplary in that it has changed over time. These changes are related to the construction of a bureaucratic capital specific to the EU, referred to as "European institutional capital" (Georgakakis, de Lassalle, 2006 and . While nothing suggests a priori that the capital possessed by Community elites is exceptional, it bears pointing out than more than fifty years of bureaucratic history of the Commission have enabled a relative integration of its higher administrative elites. This integration is objectivated in preferential paths (long internal careers within the Commission, acquisition of a credit specific to the institution, valorisation of European distinctions and awards against those liable to act as national markers, etc.). Furthermore, this construction is not entirely autonomous, i.e. completely independent from the processes of transformation of national bureaucratic capital, and officials make for good indicators of the variations in the place of law and legal training in the formation of bureaucratic capital, or of its increasing decline observed by many analysts.
Founded on more general prosopographical analysis (see Georgakakis, de Lassalle 2004 and for a more general presentation of the investigation protocol and below for some details), this paper gathers data in order to give a few elements to reply to the questions raised above. It shows for instance that while jurists (i.e. agents for whom law was the main element of their training) integrated the European Commission very early on, and, at least for some time, acquired dominant positions within that institution, they were strong only insofar as their legal training was the basis of a broader undertaking of construction and acquisition of a bureaucratic credit within which the properties of * This paper was originally presented at the Conference "The European Legal Field-Le champ juridique européen" organized by Bruno de Witte and Antoine Vauchez with the Robert Schuman Centre and the Academy of European Law (European University Institute, 25-26 September 2008).
1. We will not expand on the definitions of the concepts of "field" or "capital" in Bourdieu's theory. See for instance Bourdieu, 1998 . For a broader presentation of Bourdieu's concepts and their application to the EU, see Kauppi, 2005. jurists are either marginal in their original form or watered down. Moreover, this ability to hold dominant positions within the machine tended to be placed in competition with the rise of other agents, among whom were economists, whose properties tend to become indispensable for a high level career within the Commission.
This study on the Directors-General and Deputy Directors-General of the European Commission is part of a research programme developed since 2001 by the Centre for European Political Socioiogy (GSPE-PRISME, MISHA, CNRS-University of Strasbourg) on "European elites". This programme consists in constituting a database on Commissioners, Directors-General, Deputy Directors-General in Directorates-General and in the General Secretariat of the European Commission, as well as the main positions in the European Parliament (Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Quaestors, Presidents of committees and groups). This database now gathers more than 600 entries including "biosocial" data (age, gender, place of birth, nationality, marital status, etc.), information on careers (positions successively held), diplomas and places of training, engagements (in associations, political, European), publications and decorations. We currently have 220 biographies on Directors-General and Deputy Directors-General. Before we proceed to analyse this data, a few limitations specific to the analysis of training should be mentioned. An interesting aspect of biographical directories is the fact that they contain auto-definitions, thereby revealing the symbolic value that the agents attribute to their successive titles or positions, which makes for a good indicator of the construction process of a credit. However, there are also major limitations. In the available directories, family properties are very seldom mentioned, and while rewards obtained outside the institution are occasionally highlighted, top officials tend to valorise, whenever possible, their path within the institution. This is one of the specificities of bureaucratic capital compared to other positions that are more individualised, such as judges or lawyers. It is indeed quite arduous, unless one carries out further biographical investigation through other means, to work on legal capital, as Charle defines it (Charle, 1997) . We will then rather focus on training, which entails other difficulties. Unlike French top officials (for whom degrees are essential), European top officials tend not to particularly highlight their educational achievements and competences, especially in the European dictionaries we consulted. 2 This paradox has sociological reasons: degrees are national markers and the access to top European public sector positions is tied with the claim to defend a European general interest. The reason why they are increasingly mentioned now is precisely that the processes of de-nationalisation of paths have been underway long enough so that these national markers do not harm the agents' strategic identity. Moreover, the shaping of strategic identities takes on extremely diverse national forms. For instance, while in France degrees and places of training are important for educational and social certification and are always mentioned in biographical notices, in Great Britain Colleges prevail as social certification. As a result, we know a lot about the places of training of British top officials, but we have few elements on their fields of education. These various limitations have of course been taken into account in this study.
I. Legal training as a component of bureaucratic capital
Among the roles that have contributed to the legitimisation of the Commission as one of the key institutions of European construction, its strictly legal functions ("guardian of the treaties", "initiator of legislation", "regulating organisation", etc.) are central. Hence, many observers create a link between these functions, the weight of jurists within the Commission, and the importance of the legal 2. It bears mentioning that comparisons with national Who's Who volumes are generally not feasible, as the officials are seldom included in them, except for parachutés, who remain however in the minority. culture that supposedly prevails there (Stevens, 2001) . However, these functionalist interpretations neglect what seems to be one of the characteristic elements of the specific weight and value of this legal culture. While we may agree with these authors in acknowledging the fact that many jurists integrated the administration of the European Commission and for a long time constituted the majority of its staff, they have done so not so much to create a "place of law", or a stronghold of the nascent Community law, but rather to implement a strategy of foundation of an executive that was both social and institutional (on this point see also, Shore 2001) . In this respect, it is very striking to see that the mention of a specialisation in a field of EU law is particularly absent in the biographical notices and CVs we have consulted, as is the claim to produce or at least to disseminate a specific law (Community law) or one of its sectoral applications (e.g. competition law). Publications are more frequent on the theme of European administration than on more strictly legal themes. While legal training has doubtless represented one of the bases of this undertaking, it has not played that role per se, but rather within the framework of a broader undertaking of construction of bureaucratic capital liable to develop a European administration, and in the process, assert themselves as the best servants of this administration.
Jurists have unarguably been the first to hold top positions in the European Commission. Except for the position of Secretary-General, which was for a long time held by former ENS student Emile Noel, jurists have held most key positions in the administration. This is the case for DirectoratesGeneral (DGs) with a strong legal dimension such as DG Internal Market and DG Competition (Pieter Verloren Von Themat, Willy Slieder), and obviously of the legal service, but also of transversal DGs such as administration and budget. More surprisingly perhaps, DGs such as Economic Affairs have, at least in early stages, relied on their competence. Indeed, Helmut Allardt, the first director of Economic Affairs, was a jurist, as were the two Italians who succeeded him in that position, Franco Bobba and Ugo Mosca. Other DGs such as the current DG External Relations -possibly at the request of Walter Hallstein, himself a diplomat and jurist specialised in international law -have been managed by jurists for a long time.
Their placement in these positions appears nevertheless less as the fruit of a strategy of group placement in and for itself -jurists for jurists -than as the product of a more long-term process of development of an administration conform, viable and comparable to member states' administrations. The conflicts that have opposed the Hallstein Commission to certain member states, particularly France, are well known and have had noticeable consequences. In the early stages where state pressure on the positions was still rather weak, the strategies of appointment of top officials entailed a process of cooptation involving Hallstein and Noel quite directly. The latter tried to surround themselves with a staff that presented guarantees not only of European know-how, as has been often pointed out, but especially of an incontestable bureaucratic competence. Indeed, the Prussian model of the jurist serving the "superior interest" (Daviet-Vincent, 2005) , seemed to offer resources in terms of loyalty both inside and outside the institution. Member states have then had more influence in the appointments, but only within the framework of compromises with the president and the Secretary General of the Commission, which have contributed to reproduce the general orientation of these appointments.
This first analysis of the foundations of this administration thus contains a broader lesson on the particularities of the presence of jurists in the Commission. The legal dimension of the profiles of these top officials is linked to the reproduction, and probably to the partial European conversion, of ultimately rather ordinary forms of a national bureaucratic capital which lies in most founding states on legal competence. Generally speaking, there are common features between top European officials and their national counterparts in terms of training. On a more specific national case-by-case approach, the relationship of homology that they share should be pointed out. The German case constitutes a good example. Often endowed with more legal capital than others, German top officials are characterised by their high proportion of law PhDs -i.e. the title that was for a long time necessary in order to reach the most prestigious positions in the German civil service. Therefore, the DGs directed by Germans were for a long time directed by jurists (among others, DG External Relations and Competition). The same goes for Italians and Luxembourgers in the DG Internal Market. Conversely, the British officials who arrived at the European Commission a little later were not "jurists", like in Great Britain. 3 While this relationship of homology enables to understand that the jurist profile tends towards construction and accumulation by the institution and its members of a bureaucratic capital, it would be wrong to link this dimension solely to this relationship of homology. If legal capital is here integrated into bureaucratic capital, it is also the fruit of a strategic behaviour, understood not as a tactical move but as a long-term social strategy of construction of a social space and of their position within that space.
This dimension can be first of all perceived in the way jurists have presented themselves for a long time. We have underlined the deficiencies of our sources earlier; all signs point towards their existence as a fruit of strategies of self-presentation from the officials. When they mention their legal training, the top officials of the Commission do not indulge in a display of titles liable to distinguish them according to their legal competence. Indeed, one would think that the place where the degree was obtained (a potential indicator of its value for sociologists as well as for other readers of the biographies) is systematically mentioned. The majority of those who mention it are those who value a foreign cursus honorum (members of "small countries" who have studied in a university from a "big country", members of a "big country" aiming to play down their national ties, etc.). Similarly, imprecision on the nature of the legal training reveals the meaning taken on by the mention of said training. If the latter is certainly minimum evidence of bureaucratic value, the point is mostly to avoid distinguishing one's competence as nationally marked, i.e. the mentions of public, private, etc. -except for those of jurist in international law or compared law, precisely the ones that appear most often.
This dimension should be placed in the context of a broader process of stylisation, and beyond that of manufacturing and increasing autonomy of European bureaucratic capital. As has been observed elsewhere, in the course of European construction there have been forms of differentiation of the paths of top officials, as careers involve stages that are increasingly specific to this space, i.e. for instance experience as member of cabinet of a Commissioner, substantial "in-house" experience and multiple sectoral experiences -the transversality that comes out of that confers a particularly valuable "generalist" credit.
This has consequences in terms of training of top officials. Among the Directorates held by jurists (External Relations, Competition, Internal Market, Administration and of course Legal Service), none is in majority, regardless of circumstances, composed of "pure" jurists. Most other DGs are otherwise increasingly marked by double competences. The double competence Law/Social science therefore prevails in the DG Social Affairs and Employment, as Political science/Law does in the DG Information. Beyond these atypical cases, the double competence Law/Economy prevails as the norm everywhere. This double competence often becomes an individualised norm (double degree), complemented by a second degree abroad.
This materialises in the career of jurists who occupy positions of Director-General or Deputy Director-General in the current Commission. For instance, the German Matthias Ruete obtained law degrees in Germany (PhD) and in London (LLM). After these national and foreign experiences, he went on to be a lecturer in Germany and then in the University of Warwick, Coventry; and then started a "typical" career in the Commission. Originally an administrator in the Social Affairs and Internal Market DGs, he became Head of Unit in the DG industry. Following this transversal experience he became a member of the Research Commissioner's cabinet. He then did another multisectoral "round" as Director (DG Energy, then Enlargement and Enterprise) and eventually became Director-General for Transports and Energy. Françoise Le Bail had a similar career: a doctor in law and a lawyer, she soon abandoned her career as a jurist to integrate the DG Relex and became a spokesperson for the Belgian Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and then worked in Christiane Scriveners's cabinet. She was then advisor and Director in the DG Commerce, and became spokesperson for the President of the Commission and Deputy Director-General of DG Enterprise.
This construction of a specific bureaucratic capital, quite different from that of law producers and comparable to that of staff from Courts, for instance, can finally be seen in the remarkable career evolutions of legal service members, which demonstrate the increasing integration of legal capital in "in-house" institutional capital. 
II. Legal training as contested capital
While the process of construction of a bureaucracy in which jurists are involved, and which contributes to ensure their position, tends towards a dilution of their properties as jurists, this dilution also depends on a broader process whereby their long lasting dominant position is increasingly contested by others, especially economists. This should not be seen only as an external effect of the large European market, as we will see below.
This dimension can first of all be seen in the figures. In the first two phases of European construction , jurists prevailed over economists. Although those figures should be considered with caution, in light of the high percentage of N/A, there were 25% of jurist against 18% of economists. This balance was reversed after 1985. Under the Delors presidency, there was a surge in the number of economists (almost 38%), whereas there were fewer jurists. By 1996 the balance was less unequal (22.5% of "pure" jurists, 28.5% of "pure" economists), but most strikingly, in this new period, the sense of balance that seemed to characterize holders of this new bureaucratic capital tends to disappear. There is still a significant proportion of jurists who add an economy degree to their law degree, but the opposite is no longer true. While economists have studied law between 1973 and 1986, this double competence was less and less found after 1986.
Proportion of DGs with training in law or economics according to period
The FREQ Procedure Frequency Row Pct This evolution is confirmed by the analysis of the degrees held by the Directors-General of the current Commission. Economic training appears to prevail durably over legal training. Two thirds of the current Directors-General are indeed graduates of economics (14 out of 21), whereas only 4 out of 21 are jurists. Law degrees are also generally complemented by another competence (College of Europe for Faull, international administration for Manservisi, or human and social sciences for Quintin), which is less the case for economists. Economists have also increasingly occupied important positions in the major DGs where jurists were formerly prevalent, such as Competition, External Relations, Regional Policy.
Degrees held by the Directors-General of the current Commission
While economists are more often "pure" economists, we should not disregard the fact that they are also involved in similar strategies of accumulation of a specific institutional capital. These entail the same types of resources (double competence, but not always in law, international training, sometimes in a university of another member state, or in the US, experience in various cabinets and directorates). David O'Sullivan, Director-General for Commerce, is an economist and sociologist who graduated from the College of Europe. He also worked in the DGs Relex, EAC, Social affairs, and within cabinets (Peter Sutherland, Padraig Flynn and Romano Prodi). Similar tendencies can be observed for more sectoral profiles. Marco Buti, laureate in economics and commerce from the University of Florence, holds a Masters degree in research on economics (M.Phil) from the University of Oxford. He has published numerous books and articles on the EMU, progressively climbed the hierarchic ladder in the DG Economy and Finance (economist, head of unit, director, then Deputy DirectorGeneral), and also held positions in cabinets (Pandolfi, then Vanni d'Archifari) which enabled him to become Deputy Director-General and Director-General.
Agents with other profiles have also become increasingly present -from around 10% originally to more than 25% now. They are very diverse and can be separated into two groups: graduates in political and social sciences (this has varying values in member states) and technicians or engineers (physicians, agronomists, etc.) While this reversal cannot be seen as a victory of economists over jurists, the decrease of legal training in the European Commission remains to be interpreted.
Two hypotheses seem to prevail. The first, a functionalist one, asserts the existence of a necessity related to the construction of the single market. The second one, influenced by Marxism, consists in saying that because it is a "superstructure", the administration of the Commission only reflects a sociological evolution that can be observed everywhere, in every European country. Broadly speaking, there is an element of truth to both hypotheses, but they neglect more internal explanations, linked to the specific dynamics of the construction of the group and the social and political strategies used to invest this group.
In this perspective, we put forward three elements for explanation. First, as we have suggested above, the decrease of law is due to the jurists themselves, who have invested this bureaucratic space. Either, in the same way that they have contributed to its foundation, they have converted themselves to their institution, which influences them in return, as the evolution of their individual paths shows Or, in order to maintain their positions -not so much according to a deliberate strategy of control of positions, but rather to successfully accomplish their sectoral missions -they have attempted to make alliances with others, for example by recruiting economists (and others). In the case of Competition, the interview with Roger Simonet, former Deputy Director-General for Fishing and then for Competition, provides insights on this:
"Well, Competition, actually, I discovered it… DG Competition, at first when I arrived I sort of… wasn't very well considered because I don't come from Competition. (…) Competition was a DG with a bit of a narrow vision, that is, a purely legal vision and that shocked me, and when I was put in charge of very important cases, with Elermann, we understood we had to change a little, I'm not saying the orientation, because it was always very specific, with him I try to open Competition to a reflection on the economy. So as people left, we made arrangements to recruit economists in priority. But competition still retained a strong legal specialisation, very strictly legal. And with Elermann (…) we tried to breathe new life into the DG, by having people think beyond purely legal aspects -what is the future of Europe regarding industrialisation? And since then (…) DG Competition has been open-minded enough to deal with Americans better, especially in terms of very important world issues."
As we have mentioned above, these economists have themselves accumulated bureaucratic capital specific to the institution -as a result, they have to some extent taken the place formerly held by the jurists.
A second element for explanation has to do with the successive enlargements, which have enabled the integration in the Commission of top officials whose bureaucratic model is not structured by law, unlike in the case of Germany, for instance. This is first of all the case of British, Danish and Irish officials. This is also the case of the new member states. The top officials from new countries, with two exceptions (Maria Bohata, Czech, D-G Eurostat, has a PhD in economy, Jan Truszczynski, Polish, has degrees in international law and international economics, DD-G Enlargement), have very different profiles. They do not possess bureaucratic capital a priori and often distinguish themselves by technical capital (corresponding to the positions that were opened to them) and an international dimension.
These three phases of enlargement were not compensated by the integration of Spain, Portuguese and Greece in the 1980s, whose citizens have more "mixed" profiles, with very internationalised, "Euro-compatible" profiles. Finally, while the foundations of Europe were upheld by jurists, political supports have now shifted. This is especially the case of the structure of the college of Commissioners and its Presidents. A comparison of the appointments between the Hallstein and Delors presidencies clearly shows how the Presidents were able to surround themselves with agents whose properties were similar to their own. It is thus likely that the socio-morphological evolution of the college, which since 1996 and especially the latest Commission, where mostly economist commissioners from new member countries have gained a significant influence, does not favour a return of jurists.
Frequency Row Pct
As a conclusion, the case of the Commission highlights a specific dimension of legal capital and its transformations. It does not show that this capital has no more value, but that it is no longer the dominant instrument of certification of bureaucrat competences, including within international bureaucracies although, with the figure of the diplomat jurist (Sacriste, Vauchez, 2007) , those seemed to be places where the figure of the jurist as servant of the State forged in Prussia still prevailed. This does not preclude law from having an influence within the Commission, and the latter's role as guardian of the treaties still represents an important part of its top officials' symbolic capital. The practices of the officials are also still very much revolve around law-based interpretations of policies. The Commission has also contributed not only to the construction of Community law, but also to its dissemination and social legitimisation through the support of Community jurists. This does not either preclude the Commission from representing a place or hub of networks enabling specifically European forms of capitalisation or re-capitalisation for national jurists. This strategy was however driven more by the general undertaking of construction of positions of power by this bourgeoisie de robe and the construction of its immediate environment than by jurists as such and, especially, for law. Jurists have weight, but especially the small group of "law-makers" or outside non-jurisdictional institutions, such as law firms. This makes a general topography of the whole legal field all the more valuable. 
